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MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW: A PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
ALABAMA V. GARRETT
by Kevin A. Rogers*
I. INTRODUCTION
On February 21, 2001, the United States Supreme Court ruled on Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett and found that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited a state from being subjected to suit in federal court by a
private citizen under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act.1 The decision
itself is not surprising given the Court's recent decisions curtailing the power of
Congress to promulgate similar prophylactic legislation subjecting states to pri-
vate tort suits. Certainly under a Court of the same composition, the future of
similar prophylactic civil rights legislation bestowing such authority is in doubt.
In its recent decisions culminating in Garrett, the Court has provided an
uncomplicated, yet monumental instruction to Congress: provide specific evi-
dence of unlawful discrimination before enacting legislation designed to prevent
such discrimination. Needless to say that such an evidentiary threshold undoubt-
edly raises the bar over which Congress must perform the Fosbury Flop before
the Court will approve the constitutionality of congressional legislation passed
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Critics have stamped numerous labels on the
Court's ruling, but the chief criticism accuses the Court of engaging in activist
judicial review under the auspices of federalism. Such criticism undoubtedly
cloaks an ideological objection to the concept of sovereign immunity in its
entirety, not to mention a desire for extending the limited powers of Congress.
However persuasive such positions might be, the Court has a constitutional right
to give meaningful judicial review to legislation, and should not be required to
abdicate that right by merely placing its rubber stamp on broad prophylactic civil
rights legislation or by simply winking at Congress, either under claims that the
Constitution is malleable, or under the assertion that Congress should be afford-
ed due deference. Simply because it may be more expedient to limit the power
of the Court and increase congressional power does not provide significant justi-
fication for the Court to ignore its duty of judicial review. This note will examine
this overlooked element in the Court's ruling in Garrett: the assertion, protection,
and exercise of the Court's right to judicial review.
II. FACTS
Since the Court's ruling in Garrett was limited to the issue of sovereign immu-
nity, and did not turn on the specific facts of the case, such facts merit only a
cursory development. In Garrett, the District Court of Northern Alabama had
consolidated two cases and issued a single opinion disposing of both.' In the first
case, Patricia Garrett had served as director of nursing for the University of
* J.D. Candidate, May 2003, Mississippi College School of Law. The author gives special thanks to
Professor Mark Modak-Truran who supervised this Note.
1. 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). The American with Disabilities Act is hereinafter referred to as the ADA.
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2001).
2. Id. at 362-63.
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Alabama at Birmingham hospital? After being diagnosed with breast cancer, she
took a significant leave of absence from work in order to undergo treatment.
4
Upon her return, she was required to give up her position, and thereafter took a
transfer to a lower paying position.'
In the second case, Milton Ash was employed by the Alabama Department of
Youth Services as a security officer.' Upon beginning his employment, he asked
that his duties be tailored so that he would have a minimum amount of exposure
to carbon monoxide and cigarette smoke, due to chronic asthma.7 He was later
diagnosed with sleep apnea, and subsequently requested a transfer to the day
shift to minimize his problem.' His requests were not granted, and he filed a
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.'
Both Garrett and Ash filed separate suits under the ADA in federal court seek-
ing monetary damages from the state of Alabama for unlawful employment dis-
crimination due to each oneis disabilities.1" The state defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment claiming sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
from suit under the ADA." The district court granted the motions of the defen-
dants, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, relying on its decision
in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents. 12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
order to resolve a split among the Circuit Courts of Appeals as to whether a State
may be sued for monetary damages by a private individual under the ADA."
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
The law on which the Court chiefly relies in Garrett developed extensively
over the last quarter of the Twentieth Century, yet its roots grow deep within the
soil of constitutional interpretation. The background of the law relied on by the
Court in Garrett was composed of several branches of legal thought and consti-
tutional interpretation protruding from the Court's prior decisions. In order to
better facilitate an understanding of the background of this law, it is helpful to
categorize these different branches into four main areas: sovereign immunity,
congressional authority, disability discrimination, and federalism. Such analysis
will expedite a more complete grasp of the Court's ruling.
A. The Development of Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment
In the early case of Chisholm v. Georgia, the Supreme Court ruled that a fed-
eral court did have jurisdiction over a suit between a citizen of South Carolina








11. Id. See Garrett, 989 E Supp. 1409 (N. D. Ala. 1998).
12. Id. at 362-63. See Garrett, 193 F3d 1214 (11 th Cir. 1999). See also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
139 E3d 1426, 1433 (11 th Cir. 1998) (where the Eleventh Circuit determined that Congress validly abrogated
state sovereign immunity under the ADA, because there was clear intent to do so in the statute).
13. Id. at 363; cert. granted, 529 U.S. 1065 (2000).
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and the State of Georgia. 4 In response to this decision, the Eleventh Amendment
was ratified in 1798.5 The Eleventh Amendment stated: "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."1 Thus, states were
extended sovereign immunity from diversity suits by private citizens in federal
court under the Eleventh Amendment.
In the 1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court made a crucially
significant interpretation of the language and structure of the Eleventh
Amendment, finding that it provided a state sovereign immunity not merely from
suits based on diversity, but suits based on federal question jurisdiction as well.17
In Hans, a Louisiana citizen argued that since the Eleventh Amendment's lan-
guage only prevented suits against a state brought by a citizen of a different state,
jurisdiction was proper over federal questions. 8 The Court acknowledged that
while such a reading might be accurate according to the precise language of the
Eleventh Amendment, the history and context behind the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment merited a broader interpretation. 9 The Court reexamined
its decision in Chisholm, noting that the decision had "created such a shock of
surprise throughout the country" that Congress thereafter quickly proposed and
adopted the Eleventh Amendment, which acted to reverse the Chisholm
decision.2" Therefore, according to the Court, it was absurd to think that the
Eleventh Amendment would have intended to protect States from suits by non-
citizens in federal court, but not bar suits by its own citizens.1 Furthermore, the
Court found that the Framers implicitly understood that state sovereignty was
inherent in the nature of the Constitution.2 The concept of sovereign immunity
had "been so often laid down and acknowledged by courts and jurists that it
[was] hardly necessary to be formally asserted."2 Accordingly, sovereign immu-
nity of the states was present before the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment,
and the fact that the Eleventh Amendment left out any limitation on private suits
against a State by a citizen of that State served as evidence as to the original
understanding of the Constitution.24 Thus, despite the specific language of the
Eleventh Amendment, the Court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment created soy-
14. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
15. The Eleventh Amendment was first proposed to state legislatures on March 4, 1794, and ratified on
February 7, 1795. U.S.C.S. CONsT. amend. XI (2001) (citing history of amendment).
16. U.S. CoNST. amend. XI.
17. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Here, a citizen of Louisiana brought a bond payment suit in federal court against
Louisiana. Hans, 24 E 55 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885).
18. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
19. Id. at 10-11.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 15.
22. Id. at 14-15.
23. Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 15-16. It is a curious point often raised by critics that if sovereign immunity was embodied in
the Constitution, then why was the Eleventh Amendment necessary? It may be that such an amendment was
necessary because it was the only way that the Supreme Court could be overruled, and that Congress felt at the
time that the Court had incorrectly interpreted the Constitution. In other words, what else was Congress to do?
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ereign immunity for states from suits by private citizens regardless of whether
the suit was based on diversity or upon a federal question.
B. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and Katzenbach
The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868.26 Section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment stated in part: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws."27 Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment stated: "The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this arti-
cle."28 The debate over the meaning of "appropriate legislation" has a long and
arduous history that will likely continue into perpetuity. In sum, the central dis-
agreement has concerned the extent Congress possesses unfettered authority to
pass legislation that fits under the umbrella of the "appropriate legislation"
required by the Fourteenth Amendment. Does the identity of the ultimate arbiter
of the meaning of "appropriate legislation" change depending upon the context
of the legislation? How much deference should be afforded to Congress under §
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court examined the scope of congressional
authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 In Katzenbach, § 4(e) of the
Voting Rights Act was challenged as unconstitutional because it interfered with a
New York constitutional election requirement that required voters to be able to
read and write in English. The Court found Congress was authorized by § 5 of
25. Id. Curiously absent from the Court's reasoning was the fact that original federal question jurisdiction
was not established until 1875 by the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (2001). Such
jurisdiction did not exist at the time of the passage of the Eleventh Amendment; thus, it may be that the lan-
guage of the Eleventh Amendment does not specifically apply to federal question suits because Congress did
not view such an inclusion as necessary.
26. The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress to state legislatures on June 13, 1866.
Ratification was completed on July 9, 1868. U.S.C.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (2001) (citing history of amendment).
27. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XW § 1.
28. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XWV § 5.
29. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In the previous decision of South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966),
the Court examined the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act in light of Congressional authority under § 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment. Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, like § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
gives Congress the power to enact appropriate legislation to enforce the amendment. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV
The Court found that Congress had proper authority because of the detailed legislative inquiry into the voting
rights discrimination exemplified by debates in the House for three days and the Senate for 26 days, as well as a
nine-day hearing where 67 witnesses testified. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308-09. The Court in
Garrett later compares the legislative inquiry examined in Katzenbach to the legislative inquiry regarding the
ADA. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373 n.8.
30. Id. at 643. Section 4(e) states in part: "(1) Congress hereby declares that to secure the rights under
the fourteenth amendment of persons educated in American-flag schools in which the predominant classroom
language was other than English, it is necessary to prohibit the States from conditioning the right to vote of
such persons on ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the English language. (2) No person
who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private
school accredited by, any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in
which the predominant classroom language was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any
Federal, State, or local election because of his inability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter in the
English language." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(e). Article II, §1 of the New York Constitution states in part: "No per-
son shall become entitled to vote.. unless such a person is also able.. .to read and write English."
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the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce its protections by the use of "appropriate
legislation," and the Supreme Court's role was to evaluate the appropriateness of
the legislation. 1
The Court relied on Chief Justice Marshall's definition of the scope of legisla-
tive powers: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitu-
tion, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitu-
tion, are constitutional."32 Under such a standard, Congress was entitled to "exer-
cise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 3 Thus, "appropriate legis-
lation" was that which was adapted to the end of enforcing the Equal Protection
clause and that was not contrary to the "letter and spirit of the constitution."'
Congress had authority to "weigh ... conflicting considerations" in adapting §
4(e) to advancing the rights under the Equal Protection Clause. All that was left
for the Court to determine was whether a rational basis existed for congressional
adoption of the act, and in this case, the Court found that such a rational basis
existed. 6
However, the Court also required that the remedies provided by Congress
must not have interfered "with the letter and spirit of the Constitution."37 In this
case, the section did "not restrict or deny the franchise but in effect extend[ed]
the franchise to persons who would be denied it by state law."38 The Court con-
cluded that such a remedy did not violate the Constitution's letter and spirit.3"
C. Narrowing the Scope of CongressionalAuthority to Abrogate Sovereign
Immunity
In its recent decisions, the Supreme Court has acted to narrow the scope of
congressional authority to allow federal law to supersede, or abrogate, state sov-
ereign immunity. While Congress did have the authority to pass legislation, any
such legislation was accordingly limited by the sovereign immunity found in the
Eleventh Amendment. By the time of Garrett, the Court had recognized that the
only viable congressional method of abrogating state sovereign immunity was
through "appropriate legislation" enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the Court had not allowed abrogation of sovereign immunity
through any congressional powers under Article I. The following cases demon-
strate the arguments surrounding congressional legislative authority.
31. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 649-650.
32. Id. at 650 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)).
33. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651.
34. Id. at 651.
35. Id. at 652-53.
36. Id. at 653.
37. Id. at 656-658.
38. Id. at 657.
39. Id. at 657-58. Justice Harlan disagreed with the Court: "I believe the Court has confused the issue of
how much enforcement power Congress possesses under § 5 with the distinct issue of what questions are appro-
priate for congressional determination and what questions are essentially judicial in nature." Id. at 666 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). He further elaborated that the right to determine a substantive violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment belonged to the Court, not Congress, because allowing Congress such discretion would allow
Congress to "dilute ... equal protection" and exceed "the governmental boundaries set by the Constitution." Id.
at 668, 671.
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1. Fitzpatrick and the Scope of Section 5 Authority
In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could abrogate
state sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment by § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment." In Fitzpatrick, the district court had refused to award
monetary damages for a state retirement plan's discrimination against male
employees because it found that Congress had exceeded its authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity under Title VII, and the court of appeals affirmed.
41
The Supreme Court reversed and ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment limited
the principle of state sovereign immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment.
42
Thus, under § 5, Congress had exercised "authority that [was] plenary within the
terms of the constitutional grant, [and] it [was] exercising that authority under
one section of a constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own
terms embod[ied] limitations on State authority.' 43 Congress may have limited
sovereign immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enforcing
"appropriate legislation." Thus, the Court found that Congress could have
allowed for private suits against states by enacting "appropriate legislation"
under the Fourteenth Amendment.45
2. Union Gas and Commerce Clause Power
In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the Supreme Court considered the congres-
sional abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment by legislation enacted under the
Commerce Clause.4" In Union Gas, a suit arose between the federal government,
Pennsylvania, and a coal gasification plant over the costs associated with clean-
ing up environmental damage.47 Pennsylvania claimed that it was immune under
the Eleventh Amendment from a damage claim by Union Gas. 48 The Third
Circuit held that the language of the federal statute, CERCLA, specifically ren-
dered Pennsylvania liable for monetary damages, and Congress had authority to
abrogate Pennsylvania's sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause.49 The
Supreme Court agreed that Congress clearly intended to hold states liable under
CERCLA.5 ° The Court reconsidered Fitzpatrick and found that the same rationale
40. 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976).
41. Id. at 448, 450-51. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 390 E Supp. 278 (D. Conn. 1974) and Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 519 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. Id. at 456.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment, but noted that he believed that the States had surren-
dered any claim to sovereign immunity from suits by its own citizens in adopting the Constitution. Id. at 457-
58. (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred in judgment, but argued that the Eleventh Amendment
defense should be rejected, because it was incorrect of Congress to rely on § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
because no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment was proven. Id. at 458-59 (Stevens, J., concurring).
46. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). The Commerce Clause stated that Congress shall have the power "[tlo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 3.
47. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5-6.
48. Id.
49. See Union Gas, 832 E2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987).
50. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 13.
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for allowing Congress to authorize suit against States for money damages under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment also seemed applicable to an analysis under
the Commerce Clause." Pennsylvania argued, however, that since the Commerce
Clause existed antecedent to the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, the prin-
ciples in Fitzpatrick were not equally applicable to legislative abrogation pur-
suant to Article I congressional authority.52 The Supreme Court rejected such an
argument preferring to continue to give Congress broad legislative abrogation
authority under the Commerce Clause.53
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, objected to the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in Hans, arguing that the Eleventh
Amendment did not provide for state sovereign immunity from suits based on
federal questions. 4 Furthermore, he wrote that such a construction of the
Eleventh Amendment, in effect, hindered the ability of federal courts to protect
individual constitutional rights.5
Justice Scalia, in his partial dissent, in contrast to Justice Stevens, argued that
state sovereign immunity should be afforded more protection by the Court from
congressional abrogation. 6 Hans had provided that state sovereign immunity as a
whole was embodied in the federalist structure of the Constitution." However,
allowing Congress to abrogate such immunity under the Commerce Clause
allowed Congress to effectively overrule Hans.8 Justice Scalia concluded that the
"holding today can be applauded only by those who think state sovereign immuni-
ty so constitutionally insignificant that Hans itself might as well be abandoned." 9
3. Seminole Tribe and the overruling of Union Gas
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Court ruled that Congress did not have
authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce
Clause."0 In Seminole Tribe, the Seminole Tribe of Florida sued the State and its
governor under 25 U.S.C. § 271 0(d)(7)(A) claiming that the state and the gover-
nor violated the good faith requirement by not entering into negotiations with the
51. Id. at 15-16.
52. Id. at 17. Such an argument is important because it later became the basis for the decision overruling
Union Gas.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 27. For example, in Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985), the Court
determined that a state had not waived its immunity from suit under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §
794, by accepting funds because there was not clear abrogation language in the federal statute. Brennan wrote
in his dissent, "the Court's Eleventh Amendment doctrine diverges from text and history virtually without
regard to underlying purposes or genuinely fundamental interests." Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247-48 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). He further concluded, "In consequence, the Court has put the federal judiciary in the unseemly
position of exempting the States from compliance with laws that bind every other legal actor in our Nation."
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248.
56. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 29-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 33-35. Scalia viewed the Hans decision as "enunciating a fundamental principle of federalism,
evidenced by the Eleventh Amendment, that the States retained their sovereign prerogative of immunity." Id. at
37.
58. Id. at 36.
59. Id. at 44.
60. 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996). The Indian Commerce Clause stated that Congress had the power "[t]o regu-
late Commerce... with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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tribe concerning gaming on tribal land. 1 The district court denied the State's
motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds, but the Eleventh Circuit
reversed and found that Florida was entitled to sovereign immunity.2
The Supreme Court reexamined its prior decision in Union Gas, which allowed
Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause.' The
Court found that in Union Gas, the plurality's opinion conflicted with "established
federalism jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated our decision in Hans.
64
Thus, Union Gas incorrectly expanded federal jurisdiction under Article III by use
of the Commerce Clause, and should be overruled. 6 The Court reasoned that
since the Eleventh Amendment limited the judicial power under Article III,
Congress could not use Article I powers to circumvent such limitations.
6
Therefore, concerning the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court concluded:
[W]e reconfirm that the background principle of state sovereign immunity
embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when
the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is
under the exclusive control of the Federal Government. Even when the
Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by
private parties against unconsenting States.
67
Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment prevented Congress from abrogating
state sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause, and Florida was
immune from suit.
66
Two justices wrote dissenting opinions. In Justice Stevens' dissent, he criti-
cized the Court for preventing "Congress from providing a federal forum for a
broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and
patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation
of our vast national economy," and he also echoed his dissent in Union Gas,
arguing that the Hans decision was an incorrect construction of the Eleventh
Amendment.69
61. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51-52. Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) was part of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act. The Act required that States negotiate in good faith with a tribe in the formation of a compact.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(I)(C)(2001). Under Title 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A) provided: "The United States district
courts shall have jurisdiction over ... any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe ... for the purpose of
entering into a Tribal-State compact.., or to conduct such negotiations in good faith."
62. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 51-52. See Seminole Tribe, 801 F. Supp. 655 (S.D. Fla. 1992) and
Seminole Tribe, 11 E3d 1016 (1 lth Cir. 1994).
63. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63.
64. Id. at 64.
65. Id. at 65-66. Only the Fourteenth Amendment could have altered the balance between the balance
between the Eleventh Amendment and Article III. A provision that existed before the Eleventh Amendment
was altered by the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment cannot be altered by an antecedent
provision. Id.
66. Id. at 72.
67. Id. Since the Eleventh Amendment altered the balance of authority between Article I and Article III
powers, only an amendment enacted after the Eleventh Amendment could change such a balance.
68. Id. at 76. The Court also decided the question whether under the doctrine of Ex parte Young, the
Seminole Tribe could sue the governor. Id. at 53. In Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Court allowed a
suit against a state attorney general, and the Court held that a state actor can be sued in his or her personal
capacity. Here, the Court found that courts should hesitate applying the doctrine of Ex parte Young when
"Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created
right." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. Since the procedural scheme under § 2710(d)(3) was specific, the duty
defined was limited, and, thus, enforcement should be limited. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74-75.
69. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77, 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In Justice Souter's dissent," he disputed the historical assertion that there was
a general understanding of state sovereignty implicit in the Constitution.7' Any
interpretation extending the Eleventh Amendment to cover state sovereign immu-
nity over federal question suits was in error.72 Justice Souter further criticized
the Hans decision, finding three critical errors: a misreading of the text of the
Eleventh Amendment, a misunderstanding of the common-law doctrines that
existed at the time of the Constitution, and a misunderstanding of the early con-
ception of sovereign immunity.
73
4. Boerne and the Emergence of the Congruence and Proportionality Test
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court for the first time found con-
gressional legislation that abrogated state sovereign immunity under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to be unconstitutional.74 In Boerne, a church was pre-
vented from enlarging its building because local zoning ordinances had classi-
fied the church as a historical landmark, and the church sued under the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act.7" The district court concluded that Congress had
exceeded its authority in enacting the RFRA under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and as a result, the law was unconstitutional.76 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, declaring the RFRA to be a valid
exercise of congressional power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit decision.7 While the Court rec-
ognized the claim of the church that the RFRA was only protecting a guaranteed
liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court determined that Congress
70. The majority countered the dissenting arguments by admonishing the dissent for failing to cite any
decision other than Union Gas to provide support for its view of sovereign immunity and by stating that sover-
eign immunity is a fundamental concept in every civilized nation, distinct from any common law concepts.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68. The majority chastised the dissent writing that the dissent "disregards our case
law in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review articles and its own version of historical events." Id.
71. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 102 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 110, 114. Justice Souter noted that the earliest interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment recog-
nized that its purpose was to only bar diversity suits. See Cohen v. Virginia., 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 383
(1821). Originally, Congress rejected a proposed Eleventh Amendment that would have limited federal jurisdic-
tion over federal question cases, and this amendment was known as the Sedgwick Amendment. Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 111-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting). There was no uniform common law in
America at the time of the founding that could have been adopted under the Constitution because each state had
experienced different development of common law. Id. This includes any common law concept of sovereignty.
Id. Thus, the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity should not have been read into the Constitution, and
there was no indication that state sovereign immunity was implicit in the Constitution at the time of its framing.
Id. at 138-142. There was also significant evidence of a disagreement as to the role of state sovereign immunity
in the new government. Id. at 142-44. Additionally, the structure of the government would have been signifi-
cantly hampered by a continuing concept of state sovereignty. Id. at 149-50. The adoption of the federal system
balanced a state's exercise of sovereignty with the need to a have a supreme federal government. Id. at 150.
Thus, "sovereign immunity as it would have been known to the Framers before ratification thereafter became
inapplicable as a matter of logic in a federal suit raising a federal question." Id. at 153.
74. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
75. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511-12. See City of Flores v. Boerne, 877 E Supp. 355 (WD. Tex. 1995). The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq., provided that a government could not
pass a law that resulted in a substantial burden on a person's religious exercise unless there was a "compelling
governmental interest" and the action was the "least restrictive means of furthering" such interest.
76. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512.
77. Id. See City ofFlores v. Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996).
78. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511-12. The Court found that the RFRA was enacted in direct opposition to its
decision in Employment Division of the Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, where the Court
had allowed a state to enforce a law banning the illegal drug peyote, which local Native Americans used as a
part of religious rituals. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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could have only passed legislation under § 5 when it did so to deter or remedy a
violation of such constitutional liberties.79 Since Congress' enforcement powers
under § 5 were remedial, it may not have changed the substance of the
Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on States, and this included any redefini-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause found in the First Amendment." This limit on
congressional power was confirmed by the history of the Fourteenth Amendment
and its enforcement clause, as well as by case precedent."1 The Court concluded
that allowing Congress to determine the scope of its own powers by changing the
Fourteenth Amendment would essentially put the Constitution on the same foot-
ing as ordinary legislation. 2
Therefore, according to the Court, only it possessed the authority to define the
scope of substantive rights.8 3 In order for Congress to pass such legislation,
"[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." 4 Applying such a con-
gruence and proportionality test, the Court compared the RFRA with the Voting
Rights Act evaluated in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.5 The Court found a lack
of evidence supporting remedial legislation, and consequently the action was not
congruent to the injury to be prevented.8 The Court also found that the RFRA's
remedies were "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object
that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitu-
tional behavior."87 Thus, since the RFRA was not a congruent response to any
established pattern or practice by states, and its remedies were out of proportion
to any claimed unconstitutional action, Congress lacked the constitutional
authority to pass such legislation.8
5. Further Protection of Sovereign Immunity: Florida Prepaid and Kimel
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank, the Court found Congress could not abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Patent Clause, and Congress could not hold states amenable
79. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517-18. Such an interpretation of the role of Fourteenth Amendment legislation
was not a novel concept. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court found that the Civil Rights Act
of 1875 was not a valid act under the Fourteenth Amendment because appropriate legislation under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment must be corrective in nature.
80. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
81. Id. at 520.
82. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 19 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
83. Id. at 524.
84. Id. at 520.
85. Id. at 532.
86. Id. at 530-32. There was no evidence of any pattern of state laws being enacted because of religious
bigotry in the last 40 years. The only evidence was that some laws placed an incidental burden on religion, and
these laws were not created in order to directly burden a religion or to discriminate. Id.
87. Id. at 532.
88. Id. at 532, 534. Justices Stevens, Scalia, O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer all filed separate opinions.
However, these opinions focused on the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause and the Court's decision in
Smith.
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to patent suit by private citizens under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 In this
case, College Savings had sued Florida Prepaid under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) alleg-
ing that Florida Prepaid had infringed on College Savings' patent for financing
methodology designed to provide for funds to pay college tuition.9" On the basis
of the Seminole Tribe ruling, Florida Prepaid moved to dismiss on the basis of
sovereign immunity, but was denied by the district court, and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. 1
Relying on the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe, the Court concluded that
for the Act to abrogate state sovereign immunity, it required a clear statement of
intent by Congress and a valid grant of congressional authority.92 Here, since
congressional intent was clear, the question for the Court was whether Congress
had the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity in this case. According
to the Court, Congress could have only abrogated state sovereign immunity
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Commerce Clause or Patent
Clause. 4
Under the Court's rationale, for Congress to abrogate state sovereign immuni-
ty under § 5, the legislation must have been appropriate, or in other words, must
have been congruent and proportional under the test in Boerne.95 Here, the wrong
to be remedied was clearly patent infringement on the part of the states, but no
pattern of such infringement by States had ever been identified. 6 According to
congressional testimony, there was a lack of patent violations by the states.
97
Therefore, the Court found that Congress enacted this legislation due to only a
few assertions of patent infringement by the States, and such legislation was not
validly passed under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Justice Stevens argued in his dissent that Congress had acted validly under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect patent holders from
89. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999), the Court ruled on the same set of facts, but concerning the constitutionality of a
state waiving its sovereign immunity under the Trademark Act of 1946, or the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2001). Id. at 668-69. The Court found that Florida had not waived its sovereign immunity under the Lanham
Act. In Justice Breyer's dissent, he argued for the abolition of sovereign immunity claiming that it limited
Congress from enacting "economic legislation needed for the future" and denied it the "necessary legislative
flexibility" it needed to protect private citizens. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 700-01 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See
also Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (where Congress found that a state
could implicitly waive its sovereign immunity because it became subject to regulation of Congress when it
engaged in the operation of an interstate railroad). Also see California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957);
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247; U.S. v. Cal., 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
90. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630-31. The Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act,
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) provides in part, "Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States... infringes the patent."
91. Id. at 633. See College Savings Bank, 148 E3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
92. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635-36.
93. Id. at 635.
94. Id. at 636. The Patent Clause states that Congress has the power "[tio promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 8. Since the Court had previously ruled that
Congress could not abrogate the Eleventh Amendment by expanding Article III powers under any Article I pow-
ers in Seminole Tribe, the same reasoning was applicable here. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
95. Fla. Prepaid, 427 U.S. at 637-39.
96. Id. at 640.
97. Id. at 640-41.
98. Id. at 645-47.
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patent infringement." He chided the Court for focusing too narrowly on a lack
of congressional evidence considered by Congress before enacting the Act.
100
According to Justice Stevens, the standard required by the Court was far more
stringent than the standard that Congress had attempted to follow when it passed
the Act.0
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Supreme Court found that Congress
did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
102 The
Eleventh Circuit had ruled that Congress had not validly abrogated sovereign
immunity under the ADEA, and states possessed sovereign immunity from
suit.,0 s
Continuing its previous method of analysis, the Supreme Court expounded on
the questions of whether or not the ADEA contained a clear statement of con-
gressional intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity and whether the ADEA
was a "proper exercise of Congress' constitutional authority."'0
4 The Court con-
cluded that while the ADEA did contain a clear statement of intent to abrogate
immunity, Congress did not have authority to abrogate under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1
05
The Court recognized that for Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
it could only have done so under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, the legislation passed by Congress must have been
"appropriate," and appropriate language under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
must have served to remedy or deter conduct.'0 7 According to the test applied in
Boerne, congressional action, accordingly, must also have been congruent and
proportional to the harm to be remedied.
0
8
Under the Court's subsequent analysis, the ADEA was not appropriate legisla-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 First, the ADEA requirements were
"disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be tar-
geted by the Act.""' Since age was not a suspect classification under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, state action was only required
99. Id. at 652-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also argued that Article I gave Congress ple-
nary power over patents and copyrights, and that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification
Act merely defined Congress' exclusive jurisdictional grant. Id. at 652.
100. Id. at 654.
101. Id.
102. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, states: "It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers
find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age in employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).
Hereinafter, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act will be referred to as the ADEA.
103. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 71-72. See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1433 (1998). The Eleventh Circuit had consolidated
three sets of facts. In the first set of facts, two employees sued the University of Montevello in Alabama claim-
ing unfair discrimination because of Age. MacPherson v. Univ. of Montevallo, 938 E Supp. 785, 786 (N. D.
Ala. 1996). In the second set of facts, a group of faculty member of Florida State sued because of failure to
adjust salaries of employees because of age. Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1429. In the third set of facts, an employee of
the Florida Department of Corrections sued for failure to promote because of age. Kimel, 193 E3d at 1429.
104. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 66-67. See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1433 (11 th Cir.1998).
105. Id. at 67, 73-75.
106. Id. at 78-80.
107. Id. at 80-81.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 82-83.
110. Id. at 83.
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to be rationally related to furthering a state interest."' Since all that was required
was a reason that was rationally related to a governmental purpose, the ADEA
served to "substantively redefine the States' legal obligations with respect to age
discrimination." '112 Thus, the remedies of the ADEA were not proportional to the
asserted injury. 13
Additionally, the Court considered that the evidence found in the legislative
history did not support allowing a private individual to bring suit against the
states for age discrimination."' No pattern of discrimination had ever been iden-
tified by Congress. 5 In fact, the evidence compiled by Congress was mostly
"isolated sentences clipped from floor debates and legislative reports.""1 '
Furthermore, the general evidence collected by Congress of private discrimina-
tion was insufficient, because specific findings as to actions of the states were
required. 17 Thus, the congressional response to age discrimination in creating the
ADEA was not congruent to any age discrimination by the states. 8
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that since Congress had the power to
impose statutory obligations on state agencies, it also had the power to create
federal remedies for violations of these obligations. 9 In his mind, it was not the
place of the Court to protect the sovereignty of the states, because the Framers
had provided for such protection when they created equal representation in the
Senate. 2 Additionally, Congress was better able to balance state and federal
interests by having the flexibility to restrict or extend jurisdiction depending
upon the issue at hand. 21 While federalism concerns are to some degree mean-
ingfil, where Congress had clearly indicated intent to regulate state action, it had
made a valid policy decision, which was in accord with the Framers' delegation
of legislative authority to Congress. 22 Here, according to Justice Stevens, the
Court had applied a "novel judicial interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign




6. Morrison and Congressional Evidentiary Requirements
In United States v. Morrison, the Court considered congressional authority to
pass the Violence Against Women Act, under the Commerce Clause and § 5 of
111. Id. at 83-84.
112. Id. at 88.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 89.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 90. A 1966 report prepared by the State of California was also given great weight by Congress,
but the report makes no findings as to any widespread pattern of age discrimination across the United States.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 94-95.
122. Id. at 96.
123. Id. at 97. Stevens additionally wrote that he still supports the decision of Union Gas, and is unwilling
to accept the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe because the rationale behind it was fundamentally mistaken. Id.
at 97-98.
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the Fourteenth Amendment.124 In Morrison, a Virginia Tech woman student was
attacked and raped by two male students; the female student sued the two attack-
ers and the university, and the district court found that while the complaint did
state a claim, Congress did not have the power to enact such a provision under
both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment.12 The Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed, but the case was later heard en banc, where the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and reasoning, declaring that
Congress did not have the proper authority to pass such legislation under the
Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment.
126
On appeal to the Supreme Court, relying on the Court's prior decision in
United States v. Lopez, the Court first examined congressional authority under
the Commerce Clause.1 27 The Court found that despite the great volume of con-
gressional findings concerning "the serious impact that gender-motivated vio-
lence has on victims and their families," such violence could not have played a
substantial role in interstate commerce, thus congressional authority could not be
found under the Commerce Clause. 12' Even though the evidence gathered by
Congress was quite abundant, no specific connection between such evidence and
the actual affect on interstate commerce had been established.
129
The Court also found that Congress did not have the authority to pass such
legislation under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 ' The Court noted that there
was a significant amount of evidence in the congressional record to indicate that
a "pervasive bias [existed] in various state justice systems against victims of gen-
der-motivated violence.""1 1 The Court noted, however, that the Fourteenth
Amendment did place restrictions on congressional legislation, which were cru-
cial "to prevent the Fourteenth Amendment from obliterating the Framers' care-
fully crafted balance of power between the States and the National
Government."'2 2 One of these limitations was that the Fourteenth Amendment
limits only actions by states." Here, the Violence Against Women Act was not
124. 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000). According to the Violence Against Women Act, its purpose was:
"[p]ursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this part under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of
this part to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health,
and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for victims of
crimes of violence motivated by gender." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a)(2001). The act provided a private cause of
action: "[a] person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right
declared in subsection (b) of this section shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of com-
pensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem
appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (2001).
125. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, 604.
126. Id. at 604-05.
127. Id. at 607-09. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). In Lopez, the Court held that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded congressional authority under the Commerce Clause. Lopez, 514
U.S. at 558. The Court established that three categories of regulation are channels of interstate commerce, the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and acts that substantially affect interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 558-559.





133. Id. at 621.
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aimed at limiting discrimination by states, but was directed at criminal acts of
individuals." Here, the remedy was simply not corrective in nature, nor congru-
ent and proportional.13
D. Cleburne and Title I of the ADA
In City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, the Supreme Court made
a critical resolution as to level of scrutiny required under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in regard to the mentally disabled.136 In
Cleburne, the city had refused to issue a special use permit in accordance with a
zoning ordinance to Cleburne Living Center to operate a home for the mentally
retarded.1 37 The district court held that the ordinance did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and found that no fundamental
right was involved, and that mental disability was not a suspect or quasi-suspect
classification. 38 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, classifying the
mentally disabled as a "quasi-suspect" class under the Equal Protection Clause,
thus allowing the city to refuse to issue such a permit only if zoning ordinance
substantially furthered an important governmental purpose. 39
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit, agreeing with the district
court's holding that "no fundamental right was implicated and that mental retar-
dation was neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect classification.""' Therefore, as
the district court had determined, the ordinance only had to bear a rational rela-
tionship to a governmental purpose to be constitutional. " The Court elaborated
on this conclusion by noting several factors.'42 First, the Court found that since
the "mentally retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the
everyday world" and because such a group is so numerous and diversified, the
legislature was better equipped to respond to the group's needs." 3 Second, leg-
islative response indicated that there was little prejudice currently evident in
society, and thus, little need for an increased protection by the courts." Third,
the mentally retarded had been successful in initiating any needed legislative
response and were sufficiently able to garner support among the legislature. 4
134. Id. at 626. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
135. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26. Justice Souter's dissent, addressing only the constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause, argued that Congress had the power to pass such legislation particularly considering that the
"mountain of data assembled" was significantly more than the amount of evidence compiled in enacting Title II
of the Civil Rights Act, which had been upheld in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964) and Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
137. Id. at 435.
138. Id. at 437.
139. Id. at 437-39. See Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, Texas, 726 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1984).
140. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 437.
141. Id. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion disagrees with the classification of groups under three differ-
ent categories of review, finding that such classification do not "adequately explain the decisional process." Id.
at 451 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's opinion argued that the Court's test as applied was more strin-
gent than a rational basis test. Id. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment in part, dissenting in part).
Marshall also disputes the Court's reasoning for not applying a heightened standard of scrutiny. Id. at 467-73.
142. Id. at 442-447.
143. Id. at 442.
144. Id. at 442-43
145. Id. at 445.
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Fourth, if the mentally retarded were found to be a quasi-suspect class then it
would be difficult to distinguish other disabled groups "who can claim some
degree of prejudice from at least part of the public at large." '146
Title I of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 provided for equal oppor-
tunity for individuals with disabilities in employment.147 It stated: "No covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the
hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. " A "cov-
ered entity" is any "employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint
labor-management committee."'49
Under the language of Title I, discrimination includes "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified individual ...unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the busi-
ness," and "denying employment opportunities ... if such denial is based on the
need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation." 5 ' Reasonable
accommodations include providing for accessible facilities or job restructuring,
modifying, or reassignment."' Title I provides for several factors to be consid-
ered in determining the presence of an undue hardship, including "the nature and
cost of the accommodation," the "financial resources of the facility ... or the
impact otherwise of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility," the
"financial resources of the covered entity," and "the type of operation or opera-
tions of the covered entity."' 2
Primary enforcement authority of the ADA belongs to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the Attorney General as provided for under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.153 Such an enforcement mechanism allows for private
suit by individuals after the EEOC has issued a right to sue letter.1 14 It also allows
146. Id. According to the Court, examples of such groups include "the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill,
and the infirm." Id. at 446. The Court's final determination was that the zoning ordinance was invalid even
under this lesser standard of scrutiny, because it was the result of irrational prejudice. Id. at 447-50.
147. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2001). While the scope of the rights under the ADA is beyond the focus
of this note, the Court has issued several recent rulings that are worth noting. In Toyota Motors v. Williams, 122
S. Ct. 681 (2002), the Court limited ADA coverage of employees with carpal tunnel syndrome; in US. Airways
v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002), the Court determined that seniority rights of employees in most cases should
be considered above ADA rights of disabled workers; in Chevron US.A. Inc., v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045
(2002), the Court upheld an EEOC regulation that permitted an employer to refuse to hire a worker with med-
ical conditions that could be worsened by employment; and in Barnes v. Gorman, 122 S. Ct. 2097 (2002), the
Court ruled that punitive damages could not be assessed against municipalities for violations under the ADA.
148. Id. § 12112(a).
149. Id. § 12111(2). Additionally, an "employer" is "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has more than 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year" but "does not include . . the United States, [or] a corporation wholly
owned by the United States, or an Indian Tribe." Id. § 12111(5).
150. Id. § 12112(5).
151. Id. § 12111(9).
152. Id. § 1211 1(10)(B). The Act also provides for a general defense that "an alleged application of quali-
fication standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or
benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessi-
ty, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation." Id. § 12113(a).
153. Id. § 12117; See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-9 (2001).
154. Id. § 2000e-5.
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for remedies including reinstatement, promotion, backpay, injunctions, and attor-
neys fees, as well as compensatory and punitive damages made available under
the Civil Rights Act of 1991."'5 Despite the decision in Garrett, the EEOC still
maintains unrestricted enforcement authority under the ADA." 6
E. Alden and the Federalism Argument
Federalism certainly plays an important role behind the Court's decisions con-
tracting congressional authority in the effort to protect sovereign immunity.
Through nearly all of the Court's recent decisions, the historical arguments per-
sist as to validity of the decision in Hans extending protection of the Eleventh
Amendment. One of the best illustrations as to the historical arguments for and
against the extension of the Eleventh Amendment is found in Alden v. Maine.57
In Alden, the Supreme Court was faced with state sovereignty, not in federal
court, but in state court.155 The Supreme Court found that Congress did not have
the power under Article I of the Constitution to provide for private suits in state
courts against a non-consenting state under the Fair Labor Standards Act. 55
The Court recognized state sovereignty to be a fundamental right, clearly
incorporated into the Constitution, as attested to by the "Constitution's structure,
and its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court." ' The federal-
ist system, through its concurrent authority exercised by federal and state govern-
ments, and the writings of Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John
Marshall strongly supported state sovereign immunity.161 Additionally, the pas-
sage of the Eleventh Amendment was an effort to restore the original federalist
constitutional design altered by Chisholm."5 2 Finally, Supreme Court precedent
"reflect[ed] a settled doctrinal understanding consistent with the views of the
leading advocates of the Constitution's ratification, that sovereign immunity
derive[d] not from the Eleventh Amendment but from the structure of the origi-
nal Constitution itself.""16
155. Id. § 2000e-5 and § 1981(a) (2001). The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, etseq., served
as a model for the ADA. Duval v. County of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination, including for disability, under programs that receive federal finan-
cial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794. Congressional authority for such law is found in the Spending Clause of the
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. See South Dakota v. Dole., 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (where the Court held that the
federal government could withhold federal highway funds from a state if the state refused to raise the minimum
drinking age limit to 21 under Spending Clause authority).
156. Thus, states do not have a complete license to discriminate against disabled workers. Michael L.
Russell, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Eleventh Amendment: Do States Have a License to
Discriminate?, 28 OHio N. U. L. REv. 133 (2001). In addition to redress through government means, private cit-
izens may also be able to recover under state disability discrimination laws, although such laws may be lacking.
See Ruth Colker and Adam Milani, Garrett, Disability Policy, and Federalism: A Symposium on Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett: The Post-Garrett World. Insufficient State Protection Against
Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1075 (2002). Thus, private citizens may need to petition their local
state governments to provide adequate disability discrimination protection, instead of the national government.
157. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
158. Id. at 711-12.
159. Id. In Alden, probation officers had sued Maine in federal court for violations of the overtime provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and sought compensatory and liquidated damages. Id.
160. Id. at 711-13.
161. Id. at 715-718.
162. Id. at 721-22.
163. Id. at 728.
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The Court also acknowledged that since states were immune from private suit
in federal court under the federalist structure found in the Constitution, to allow
them to be sued in state court by private citizens "would be even more offensive
to state sovereignty than a power to authorize the suits in a federal forum.'
16 4
Additionally, the Court reasoned that such private suits would have endangered
the treasuries of the States, hindered decision-making ability, and strained the
"allocation of scarce resources.""16 The Court, while noting the implications of
sovereign immunity, also affirmed that it was "unwilling to assume the States
will refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United
States.""1 '
Justice Souter disagreed with the Court's historical argument defining federal-
ism and its effect on state sovereign immunity. First, Souter disputed the findings
by the Court that there was any fundamental notion of sovereignty enjoyed by the
States prior to the Constitution. 16 At the time of the formation of the
Constitution there was no settled definition and practice of sovereign immuni-
ty.1"9 At the Constitutional Convention, there was no discussion as to the reten-
tion of a State's sovereign immunity.7 Even Alexander Hamilton's writings
focused only on state immunity from state law claims, and would not have
included federal claims. 71 Additionally, there was evidence of disagreement in
ratification debates as to sovereign immunity as found in statements by Edmund
Randolph and James Wilson.172 Thus, according to Justice Souter, there was no
consensus as to the status of sovereign immunity at the time of ratification either.
173 Such uncertainty was evidenced by the Court's decision in Chisholm, where
there was no evidence of any kind of "natural law conception of sovereign immu-
nity" claimed by the Court to have been present at the time of the Constitution.'74
Second, Souter objected to the Court's structural argument in favor of federal-
ism, stating "that the federal constitutional structure itself necessitate[d] recogni-
tion of some degree of state autonomy broad enough to include sovereign immu-
nity from suit in a State's own courts, regardless of the federal source of the
claim asserted against the State.' ' 7 5 However, state and federal governments
maintained sovereignty only with respect to what was under their authorities.'76
Thus, Maine was not sovereign because the objective of the FLSA was a part of
the national government. 77 Maine could not have claimed that since it had creat-
ed its own courts, that it should have decided the kinds of claims that these
164. Id. at 749.
165. Id. at 750-51.
166. Id. at 755. There was no waiver by Maine of its sovereign immunity, because it had not expressly cho-
sen to consent to suit in this case. Id. at 757-58.
167. Id. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting). Souter also noted that if the Court is correct in its reasoning as to the
inherent nature of sovereign immunity, then the Eleventh Amendment was merely superfluous. Id. at 761.
168. Id. at 762.
169. Id. at 772.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 773 n. 13. See also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S at 145-49.
172. Id. at 775-778.
173. Id. at 778.
174. Id. at 781.
175. Id. at 799.
176. Id. at 800 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 410).
177. Id.
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courts may hear, because once Maine created state courts of general jurisdiction,
it submitted to the authority of the federal government under the Supremacy
Clause.178 This authority required state courts to hear a case based on a federal
cause of action, because a state was not sovereign to a federal claim.
79
IV GARRETT
In Garrett, the Supreme Court found that the provisions of Title I of the ADA,
passed pursuant to congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. 180 The Garrett decision did not render Title I of the ADA
unconstitutional, but only ruled that it was not a constitutional abrogation of sov-
ereign immunity found in the Eleventh Amendment. 8
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist, and joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, continued along the same § 5 analysis
that the Court had engaged in, beginning with Boerne. First, the Court required
that the ADA express a clear intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and
since such intent was clear from the statutory language, the main issue before the
Court was whether Congress had constitutional authority to enact such legisla-
tion. 2 Since Congress did not have constitutional authority to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity under any of its Article I powers, including the
Commerce Clause, it could only have validly abrogated such immunity through
the Fourteenth Amendment. 83
Relying on Fitzpatrick, the Court noted that § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
gave Congress the power to enforce the guarantees of the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment by "appropriate legislation."'84 However, the power to
enforce these guarantees was not remedial in nature; thus, the power to determine
the substance of these guarantees belonged not to Congress, but to the Court.8
178. Id. at 801.
179. Id. Justice Souter also recognized that the effect of the Court's decision in Alden, coupled with its
decision in Seminole Tribe, provided a total barrier to individual enforcement of federal claims. Id. at 809.
180. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360. The court specifically did not address the issue of whether suits under Title
II of the ADA would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at n. 1. Title II states that "no qualified individ-
ual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the bene-
fits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such enti-
ty. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Neither did the Court find the ADA completely unconstitutional, it was only unconstitu-
tional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The ADA may very well be constitutional under the Commerce Clause,
as is the ADEA; however, since the Eleventh Amendment cannot be abrogated by the Commerce Clause, the
states would still retain sovereign immunity if the ADA was constitutional under the Commerce Clause.
181. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 360
182. Id. at 364. Title I states in part: "No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
183. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.
184. Id. at 365.
185. Id.
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Therefore, under the two-part congruence and proportionality test in Boerne, leg-
islation passed pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment must have demon-
strated "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end." '186
The Court's first step in the congruence and proportionality test required the
identification of the "scope of the constitutional right at issue."1 '7 The Court
looked to its prior decision concerning the Equal Protection Clause in Cleburne,
which determined that disability discrimination was only subject to rational basis
review.1"'
Under the congruence portion of the test, the Court turned to the question of
"whether Congress identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional employ-
ment discrimination by the States against the disabled." ' The Court found that
the evidence of a pattern of disability discrimination in employment by state gov-
ernments was severely lacking."9 ' First, the Court discounted evidence of
employment discrimination by local governments and municipalities, because
they are not afforded Eleventh Amendment protection. 1 Second, while Congress
did make a general finding as to the existence of discrimination in society, nearly
all of the specifics gathered by Congress did not cover actions by the States. 92
Even the six examples regarding states seemed to be questionable findings of
discrimination in light of the decision in Cleburne, because they contained no
evidence to indicate whether or not the state employers might have had a rational
basis for the alleged discrimination.9 ' Thus, Congress did not present sufficient
evidence to indicate that state governments were engaged in unlawful disability
discrimination. 1
9 4
The Court also contrasted the amount of evidence considered by Congress
before enacting the ADA to the amount of evidence considered before enacting
the Voting Rights Act, as examined by the Court in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.9 5 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, Congress had carefully outlined
a pattern of discrimination."9 However, the Court in Garrett noted, "The contrast
between this kind of evidence, and the evidence that Congress considered in the
present case, is stark."' 9 7 Thus, the Court determined that the ADA was not con-
gruent to the asserted harm because there was no evidence of any pattern of
unlawful employment disability discrimination.199
Applying the proportionality portion of Boerne's test, the Court determined
that the rights and remedies granted by the ADA were clearly out of proportion
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 365-68.
189. Id. at 368.
190. Id. at 368-70.
191. Id. at 369. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
192. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370.
193. Id. at 369-70.
194. Id. at 370.
195. Id. at 373. The Court noted that the enforcement provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, considered
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and the Fourteenth Amendment are "virtually identical." Id. at n. 8.
196. Id. at 373.
197. Id. at374.
198. Id. at 370-72.
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to the harm to be prevented. 9' Under the ADA, employers were only allowed to
refuse to make reasonable accommodations for employees where it would
impose an undue hardship."' 0 However, under the Constitution, a state would only
have to provide a rational basis for a discriminatory action against disabled indi-
viduals." 1 The accommodation duty for employees required by the ADA sur-
passed what was required by the Constitution, by charging the state employer
with a burden to prove undue hardship, instead of charging the individual with a
burden to prove lack of rational basis.0 2
Thus, while, it is Congress' prerogative to construct and adopt a "desirable
public policy," a pattern of unlawful employment discrimination by the States
violating the Fourteenth Amendment was required for Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, as well as a proportional remedy that specifically targeted
the violation. 3 Such requirements were not met here, and to allow Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity would allow them to reformulate that
Fourteenth Amendment requirement decided in Cleburne.2'
B. Justice Kennedy s Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennedy objected in his concurring opinion to the dissent's assump-
tion that a State must be guilty of unlawful disability discrimination simply
because of a general finding that such discrimination was pervasive in the private
sector.2" He stated, "It is a most serious charge to say a State has engaged in a
pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the equal protection of the laws..
. .,206 He also wrote that merely because a state had failed to revise its policies
that may have appeared incorrect in light of the policy of the ADA did not neces-
sarily indicate that there was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.27 Here,
according to the Court, no equal protection violation had been shown concerning
the states.208 According to Justice Kennedy, if there were such violations, they
would be evident in judicial proceedings of the courts of the United States, and
such evidence was nonexistent.2 9 States cannot be held liable for money dam-
ages to private citizens in federal court when there has been no pattern or prac-
tice of discrimination, and such pattern or practice was not established by
Congress in the legislative history of the ADA. 21 0
C. Justice Breyer ' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer in his dissent wrote, "Congress reasonably could have conclud-
ed that the remedy before us constitutes an 'appropriate' way to enforce this
199. Id. at 372.
200. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).








209. Id. at 375-76.
210. Id. at 376.
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basic equal protection requirement." '' Justice Breyer believed that the main
problem with the Court's decision was the evidentiary requirements the Court
placed on Congress.212 Here, Congress had assembled a "vast legislative record"
that documented widespread discrimination against disabled persons. 13 This evi-
dence as to general treatment of disabled individuals necessarily implied that
state governments must also have engaged in such action. 4 Justice Breyer also
attached an appendix in which he documented nearly 300 discrimination exam-
ples by state governments that Congress had considered.21 He argued that
Congress should not have been required to evaluate evidence as a court of law
might, but instead should be allowed to "draw general conclusions" in interpret-
ing evidence.1 Here, "Congress expressly found substantial unjustified discrim-
ination against persons with disabilities," and in light of the evidence, Congress
was entitled to reasonably find unconstitutional discrimination.217
Furthermore, Justice Breyer advocated that while a strict judicial standard of
evidentiary review might well be applicable in a court of law, such an approach
should not have applied to Congress.218 The Court should have instead reviewed
acts of the legislature according to a rational basis standard, which would have
served as a judicial restraint.219 Congress should not be subjected to the limita-
tions of evidence evaluation that courts are limited to, because "[u]nlike courts,
Congress can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the magnitude
of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy."22
In regard to the proportionality portion of the test, according to Justice Breyer,
while the Court might have argued that the remedy of the ADA was not "propor-
tional" to the violation to be remedied, there was nothing wrong with allowing a
remedy that required reasonable accommodation."' Even if there was a differ-
ence between what was reasonable statutorily and what was reasonable constitu-
tionally, the power granted by § 5 was to allow Congress to require more than the
absolute minimum.222 Thus, the Court should have been willing to defer to
Congress as long as there was a rational basis for Congressional action. Justice
Breyer concluded, "The Court, through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferen-
tial review, and its failure to distinguish between judicial and legislative constitu-
tional competencies, improperly invade[d] a power that the Constitution
assign[ed] to Congress." '223
V ANALYSIS
The Garrett decision will undoubtedly have a significant impact on three
areas of law: the future of civil rights legislation; sovereign immunity; and judi-
211. Id. at 377 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 378.
215. Id. at 379. These examples comprise Appendix C of the opinion. Id. at 391-424.
216. Id. at 380.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 384.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 385-86.
222. Id. at 386.
223. Id. at 388.
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cial review.24 Only future litigation will fully reveal Garrett's impact on the con-
stitutionality of civil rights legislation. Garrett opened the door for future cases
challenging the constitutionality of other sections of the American with
Disabilities Act, most notably Title II, not to mention other civil rights legisla-
tion, such as the Family and Medical Leave Act.
2 ' Opening such a door means
that those desiring to uphold such legislation will undoubtedly search for new
constitutional authority to pass legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity,
such as under the Spending Clause, or by waiver under the Rehabilitation Act.
226
Garrett also reaffirmed the concept of state sovereign immunity found in the
Eleventh Amendment, which is in the precarious position of being both simulta-
neously ingrained into American jurisprudence and perched on the edge of judi-
cial abolition.227 With majority and minority opinions containing such differing
structural, statutory, and historical interpretations, sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment will continue to be disputed law, and may well be curtailed
or eliminated entirely by a Supreme Court of a different composition.228
The Court's conception of the scope and depth of judicial review, as applied in
Garrett, is a significant aspect of the Court's decision that has been overlooked in
much of the recent scholarship. Judicial review, as applied by the Court, encom-
passes such touchstone arguments as federalism and congressional deference,
particularly concerning § 5 authority.229 Judicial review, federalism, and the
224. Undoubtedly, it will impact other areas, most notably disability law, but this not the focus of this note.
For such an analysis see Jaclyn A. Okin, Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?: An Analysis of University of
Alabama v. Garrett and Its Impact on People with Disabilities, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POC'Y & LAW 663
(2001) and Christina M. Royer, Paradise Lost? State Employee's Rights in the Wake of "New Federalism," 34
AKRON L. REV. 637 (2001).
225. Several circuits have subsequently held after Garrett that Title II of the ADA was an unconstitutional
exercise of § 5 authority in subjecting states to suit. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sciences Center of Brooklyn,
280 E3d 98 (2d Cir. 2001); Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 E3d 974 (5th Cir. 2001); Thompson v. Colorado, 278
F.3d 1020 (10th Cir. 2001). However, other circuits have disagreed. Hason v. Medical Bd. of California, 279 E3d
1167 (9th Cir. 2002); Kiman v. New Hampshire Dept. of Corrections, 301 E3d 13 (1st Cir. 2002).
Circuits have also considered the constitutionality of the Family and Medical Leave Act, with a majority of the
courts finding it to invalidly abrogate sovereign immunity. Compare Hibbs v. Dept. of Human Res., 273 F.3d
844 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding the FMLA to be valid) with Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 E3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001),
Towosel v. Montana., 233 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 2000); Chittister v. Dept. of Cmty. and Econ. Dev., 226 F3d 223
(3d Cir. 2000); Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F3d 519 (5th Cir. 2000); Sims v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 219 E3d 559
(6th Cir. 2000) and Hale v. Mann, 219 E3d 61 (2d Cir. 2000). See also Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Immunity
of States in Private Actions for Damages under Family and Medical Leave Act (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601 et seq.),
180 A.L.R. FED 579 (2002).
226. Under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, circuits have held that a state has waived its sovereign
immunity by accepting federal funds and could be sued under the same discrimination provisions as are found in
the ADA. Carten v. Kent State Univ., 282 E3d 391 (6th Cir. 2002); Grey v. Wilburn, 270 E3d 607 (8th Cir.
2001); Douglas v. California Dept. of Youth Auth., 271 E3d 812 (9th Cir. 2001). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit
recently granted a motion for rehearing Garrett on the issue of waiver under the Rehabilitation Act. Garrett, 276
F3d 1227 (2001). However, in Reickenbacker 274 E3d at 983, the Fifth Circuit held that the Rehabilitation Act
was unconstitutional. See also Shepard v. Irving, 204 F. Supp. 2d 902 (E.D. Va. 2002).
227. See Joseph M. Pellicciotti, Redefining the Relationship Between the States and the Federal
Government: A Focus on the Supreme Courtis Expansion of the Principle of Sovereign Immunity, 11 B. U. PuB.
INT. L. J. 1 (2001).
228. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Symposium: Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism,
and State Sovereign Immunity: Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1201 (2001) and Louise Weinberg,
Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends ofAlden, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1113 (2001) for opposition to sover-
eign immunity; see Alfred Hill, In Defense of Our Law of Sovereign Immunity, 42 B.C.L. REv. 485 (2001) for
support of sovereign immunity. For historical background, see John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional
Power to Create Causes of Action against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1413 (1975).
229. See Ronald Rotunda, Symposium: Garrett, Disability Policy, and Federalism: The Eleventh
Amendment, Garrett, and Protection for Civil Rights, 53 ALA. L. REv. 1183 (2002).
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scope of § 5 authority, are interrelated issues that are crucially important to the
future of not only disability discrimination legislation, but also to other possible
future legislation, including civil rights. Opposing conceptions of federalism cat-
alyze the argument between the majority and the minority of the Court, and it is
an understatement that the corresponding struggle between judicial review and
congressional deference constitutes the chief ideological difference between the
majority and the minority of the Supreme Court. The Court's stance on these
issues under the umbrella of judicial review may well prove to be the most signif-
icant aspect of the Garrett decision.
A. Right to Judicial Review
The Court has laid down a number of basic guidelines for judicial review of
the constitutionality of legislation. Legislation passed by Congress "must be
based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.""
23 Justice
Marshall said long ago in Marbury: "The powers of the legislature are defined
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitu-
tion is written." '231 He also first formulated the concept of judicial review in
Marbury stating: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is." '232 Finally, in McCulloch, Marshall stated the
requirements for constitutionality: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution are constitutional.'
233
Thus, the concept of judicial review has been incorporated into American
jurisprudence for nearly 200 years. Generally, it had become accepted that the
Supreme Court had not only the right, but the duty to review legislation as to its
constitutionality. Yet, the right to judicial review has come under attack by those
that seek to increase the scope and power of the federal government, and view
judicial review as a roadblock on the road to civil rights reform. 21 Some of these
critics have falsely labeled judicial review as judicial activism, and chastised the
Court for preventing Congress from passing needed legislation. However, the
Court, in its role as a court of judicial review, has acted to hold Congress
accountable for broad sweeping legislation passed under the guise of constitu-
tional authority, not as protection of state governments, but as a protection of the
federal government.
1. Right to Judicial Review as Opposed to Assertion of "New Federalism"
Much of the discussion and criticism that has emerged concerning the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court has claimed that the only possible reasoning
230. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607
231. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176.
232. Id. at 177.
233. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
234. See Ruth Colker and James J. Bradney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2001); Neal Devins,
Symposium: The Constitution in Exhile: Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the Courtis Anti-
Congress Crusade, 51 DuKE. L. J. 435 (2001); and Lynn A. Baker and Ernest A. Young, Symposium: The
Constitution in Exhile: Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DuKE L. J. 75 (2001).
[VOL. 22: 101
2002] MEANINGFUL JUDICIAL REVIEW A PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 125
behind the majority's stance was an unrelenting ideological devotion to federal-
ism, and, indeed, critics have termed such a devotion "New Federalism." '235 "New
Federalism," in their minds, is a new-found effort by the Court to protect the
powers traditionally given to States and limit federal government legislation that
infringes upon such traditional powers. While federalism inherent in the con-
cepts of separation of powers and limited government forms much of the basis
for the Court's stance, an overlooked element in the majority's ideology is the
assertion of the right of judicial review.
236
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, Justice Harlan wrote in his dissent, "I believe the
Court has confused the issue of how much enforcement power Congress possess-
es under § 5 with the distinct issue of what questions are appropriate for congres-
sional determination and what questions are essentially judicial in nature. ' 237 In
Justice Harlan's opinion, the right to determine a substantive violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment belonged to the Court, not Congress, because allowing
Congress such discretion would allow Congress to "dilute equal protection. 238
Thus, Congress should be "subject to the governmental boundaries set by the
Constitution. 239
In Boerne, Justice Kennedy wrote that the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment "confirms the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the
Enforcement Clause. ' 240 According to Justice Kennedy, the Fourteenth
Amendment was expressly designed to prevent Congress from obtaining "prima-
ry power to interpret and elaborate on the meaning of the new Amendment
through legislation. '241 Thus, "[t]he design of the Fourteenth Amendment has
proved significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers
between Congress and the Judiciary."242 Justice Kennedy finally noted:
If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchange-
able by ordinary means.' It would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and,
like other acts.., alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.'
The same principle was also affirmed by Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Garrett that stated that the Court, not Congress, has the "responsibility ... to
define the substance of constitutional guarantees."'2 "
235. See Note, The Irrational Application of Rational Basis: Kimel, Garrett, and Congressional Power to
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 114 Harm. L. Rev. 2146 (2001), for criticism of the Court's analysis.
236. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580-89 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) and
Ronald D. Rotunda, Resurrecting Federalism Under the New Tenth And Fourteenth Amendments, 29 TEXAS TECH
L. RE. 953 (1988).
237. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 668.
239. Id. at 671.
240. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
241. Id. at 524.
242. Id. at 523-24
243. Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
244. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
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The primary concern of the Court was that if Congress was not only allowed
to prescribe remedial legislation to correct an injustice, but also to determine if
an injustice actually exists, Congress effectively would possess unlimited pro-
phylactic authority. Logically, when two entities share power, particularly in the
same manner as the federal and state governments, when one entity's power is
limited, the other is necessarily increased. So, where congressional power is cur-
tailed, the result is an increase, or at least a reinforcement, of state power. Justice
Kennedy in another opinion noted, "The limited and enumerated powers granted
to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the National Government,
moreover, underscore the vital role reserved to the States by the constitutional
design.""24 Thus, the interplay between the constitutional limitation of congres-
sional power enforced by the Supreme Court, and the power subsequently left to
the states, created an illusion that such a limitation by the Court was solely a pro-
tection of States' rights, or Federalism, where in fact, the Court was also assert-
ing its right of judicial review in curtailing congressional legislative authority.
Therefore, while federalism has played a role in the Court's recent decisions,
those decisions, including Garrett, are also assertions of the right to judicial
review.46
2. Judicial Review: A More Consistent Approach
Critics of the recent Supreme Court decisions have vigorously asserted that
the Court should be willing to defer to Congress on legislation under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Stevens advocated, "The importance of respect-
ing the Framers' decision to assign the business of lawmaking to the Congress
dictates firm resistance to the present majority's repeated substitution of its own
views of federalism for those expressed in statutes enacted by the Congress and
signed by the President." '247 Also, in Garrett, Justice Breyer wrote, "The Court,
through its evidentiary demands, its non-deferential review, and its failure to dis-
tinguish between judicial and legislative constitutional competencies, improperly
invades a power that the Constitution assigns to Congress." '248
However, as expedient as deference to Congress might be, in the instance
where congressional power has the ability to go unmonitored, the Supreme
Court's right to judicial review would serve as the only check on congressional
power. Justice Breyer has criticized the Court's restriction of congressional
power as limiting Congress' ability "to enact economic legislation needed for the
future" and denying "necessary legislative flexibility. 249 Yet, such a stance nec-
essarily characterizes the Supreme Court as a practical hindrance to congression-
al legislation, and negates judicial review. In fact, a broad policy of deference to
Congress essentially eviscerates judicial review. However, such a policy of broad
deference to Congress results in a practical anomaly, as was evidenced in Boerne.
245. Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
246. For a defense of the enforcement of federalism, see Marci A. Hamilton, Symposium: New Voice on the
New Federalism: Why Federalism Must Be Enforced: A Response to Professor Kramer, 46 ViLL. L. REV. 1069
(2001).
247. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648 n. 7).
249. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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In Boerne, the Supreme Court found that the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act was unconstitutional under the congruence and proportionality test.
2"' Even
the Garrett minority did not object to the test applied in Boerne. Yet, under a
broad principle of deference to Congress, the Court could not have overturned
the RFRA. Under congressional deference, the Court would have yielded to
Congress' policy decisions. Yet, the Garrett minority, all of whom were firmly
implanted against the RFRA, also argued that the ADEA and the ADA should be
upheld as constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment by according appro-
priate deference to congressional decision-making. Why defer in one case, and
apply a congruence and proportionality standard in the next?
One possible explanation might be that the RFRA was clearly unconstitutional
because of its effect on the Free Exercise Clause under the First Amendment, and
the ADEA and ADA are quite different pieces of legislation. Thus, the Court
should review legislation when it is clearly unconstitutional and defer when it is
not.
Another possible explanation might conclude that the RFRA was examined in
Boerne because the RFRA was enacted to overturn a previous decision of the
Court. Thus, the Court should review legislation when it is enacted to improperly
overrule prior decisions.
Yet, both explanations fail to set any definite parameters for evaluating
whether legislation should be reviewed at all. There is little doubt that the RFRA
would have been just as unconstitutional with or without a prior decision by the
Supreme Court. Such an untenable approach reveals the strength of the consis-
tent congruent and proportional judicial review of congressional legislation, and
highlights the inconsistency of broad deference to Congress. In other words,
broad deference leaves little room for the Court to review legislation that is sus-
pect, particularly because there is little principle that would allow judicial review
in such circumstances. Thus, the most logical and consistent approach is to
always review the constitutionality of legislation, as opposed to review only in
selected cases, where the criteria for selection is undefined and unprincipled.5
B. The Boerne Test: An Applicable Standard
Even if critics were to agree that meaningful judicial review of all legislation
was a more consistent approach, some might argue that the congruent and pro-
portional standard of review applied to legislation passed under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment was difficult to apply, and should be discarded because
of such difficulty.252 Others might argue for a diminished standard of review,
such as the rational basis standard of review, which in practical effect would
serve as a rubber stamp on legislation.2 13 While such arguments as to the ease of
250. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511.
251. This is not to say that the Court should never defer to Congress, but where Congress has broad leg-
islative authority with few boundaries, deference should be severely limited, and the Court should not serve sim-
ply as a rubber stamp on legislation exceeding such boundaries.
252. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Symposium: The Powers of Congress Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment after City of Boerne v. Flores, 32 IND. L. REv. 163 (1988).
253. For discussion of why rational basis review should be applied see Evan H. Caminker, Symposium:
Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign Immunity: "Appropriate"
Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001).
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applicability of the congruence and proportionality standard may well have had
some merit before Garrett, the Court in Garrett simplified the matter by apply-
ing its standard and giving clear guidance on how the standard should be applied
in the future.
First, the Court's traditional analysis under the congruence part of the test cen-
tered on the actual harm committed, requiring the type of evidence indicating a
pattern of discriminatory conduct as was considered in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach."4 However, in recent times, the level of evidence required by the
Court has been difficult to ascertain. In Boerne, for example, the Court found the
evidence considered in congressional hearings only pertained to incidental reli-
gious discrimination."' In College Savings and Florida Prepaid, no evidence was
ever found to indicate that state governments had engaged in a pattern of patent
infringement." 6 In Kimel, no specific finding was ever made as to age discrimi-
nation by state governments, though there was evidence of a general finding of
discrimination .
5 7
Likewise, in Garrett, no evidence had been produced that indicated that states
were unlawfully discriminating against disabled individuals in employment.5
Thus, the Court in Garrett narrowly defined the evidence it required. The Court
only considered the narrow evidence of unlawful employment discrimination by
state governments, and dismissed other unrelated evidence as irrelevant.25
Therefore, in order to apply the congruence portion of the test, evidence must be
considered from a narrow perspective producing specific conclusions as to the
presence of harm in the context of the facts at issue, rather than mere general
conclusions as to the presence of any harm.26 Such evidence should also consid-
er that States may well have a legitimate reason for disability discrimination,
since ordinarily such discrimination is only subject to rational basis review.261
254. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 373.
255. 521 U.S. at 530-31. Such acts included autopsies performed contrary to an individuals religious
beliefs and zoning ordinances that created inconveniences.
256. 527 U.S. at 640.
257. 528 U.S. at 89.
258. 531 U.S. at 368.
259. Id. at 369.
260. The context of the facts at issue should be limited as narrowly as possible. In other words, for disabili-
ty employment discrimination by states, there needs to be evidence that states actually unlawfully discriminated.
Certainly, this creates a high hurdle for Congress, particularly when alleged discrimination is subject to rational
basis review, which means, of course, that a state must not have had a rational basis for discrimination.
261. Is this a judicially created standard? Perhaps, to the extent that evidence should be gathered from both
sides, as opposed to hearing only one side of the facts. Also consider, that Justice Kennedy has stated: "It is a
most serious charge to say a State has engaged in a pattern or practice designed to deny its citizens the equal
protection of the laws, particularly where the accusation is based not on hostility but instead on the failure to act
or the omission to remedy." Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375. Justice Kennedy's remark seems to indicate that with dis-
ability discrimination, discrimination may not be based on hostility as much as it is based on mere oversight and
failure to change procedures. In this case, it seems perfectly reasonable to require the Congress consider evi-
dence from both parties. For a criticism of the Court's consideration of scrutiny standards in Garrett, see
Melissa Hart, Symposium: New Voices on the New Federalism: Conflating Scope of Right With Standard of
Review: The Supreme Court's "Strict Scrutiny" of Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,
46 VILL. L. Rv. 1091 (2001).
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The Court's analysis of the proportional part of the test has centered on the
proportion of the remedy prescribed in relation to the possible harm.
262 In
Boerne, the Court found that the RFRA was out of proportion with any religious
discrimination because the method of enforcement allowed any individual to
claim that his or her exercise of religion had been infringed on, and would put
the burden of proof on the government, severely hampering the traditional regu-
latory role of the government.263 In Kimel, the Court held that the ADEA required
more of state employers than would be required constitutionally, which is a ratio-
nal basis, yet the ADEA specifically made all age discrimination, even that that
was rationally based, unlawful.2" In Morrison, the Court held that since the rem-
edy allowed was against an official, it was not covered under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Amendment only covered actions by states.
266 In
Garrett, the remedy created by Congress was disproportionate because it
required an employer to prove an undue hardship in discrimination against dis-
abled individuals, instead of the constitutionally required rational basis.6 Thus,
under the proportional part of the test, the Court must determine if the remedy
exceeds what is constitutionally required by the purported harm, and if the reme-
dy is not proportional to such harm, then the second part of the test must fail.
So, while many critics may have argued that the congruence and proportional-
ity test applied by the Court in prior decision was difficult to practically apply,
the Court in Garrett, simplified the two part test, by narrowly defining the evi-
dence it required of Congress to pass such prophylactic legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and by requiring a proportional remedy.
C. Restraint on Legislation: Added Benefits of Judicial Review
Judicial review of § 5 legislation also offers added benefits not supplied by
congressional deference. The Court applies a high evidentiary standard to pre-
vent the passage of measures that are not needed and that are motivated by cur-
rent politics. Thus, judicial review prevents Congress from passing laws based on
popular politics, and removes the burden from individual members of Congress
of having to evaluate for themselves the constitutionality of legislation.
2 67
Judicial review also leaves constitutional evaluation to those that are experienced
and competent in such analysis, and those that are less vulnerable to changing
262. For discussion on proportionality analysis, see Marci A. Hamilton and David Schoenbrod,
Symposium: The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21
CARDozo L. REV. 469 (Dec. 1999). Professor Hamilton was the lead counsel for the City of Boeme in City of
Boerne v. Flores. See also Tracy A. Thomas, Congress 'Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS. L.
RE. 673 (2001).
263. Boerne, 521 at 533-34. For a discussion of the RFRA see William W Van Alstyne, The Failure of The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DuKE L. J. 291 (1996).
264. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86.
265. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 626.
266. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372.
267. The Constitution was drafted to minimize the effect of popular politics, which are movements that
tend to cycle throughout history. For instance, it might be popular politics to ignore the rights of captive terror-
ists, but such action is certainly not lawful. The Constitution, by setting up a framework for government, is
designed to prevent the law from drastically changing merely because of popular opinion, except, of course,
through the Amendment process. While members of Congress take an oath to uphold the Constitution, the pres-
sure of popular politics is self-evident, and denial of such realistic pressures is idealistically absurd.
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political pressures. Thus, it also serves to allow members of Congress to tend to
the needs of constituents, political parties, and special interests, when proposed
legislation is on the border of constitutionality. Therefore, judicial review can
properly be classified as a benefit, rather than a detriment, to Congress.
1. Setting a High Evidentiary Bar
In Garrett, Justice Breyer challenged the level of evidence that the Court
required of Congress: "The Court's failure to find sufficient evidentiary support
may well rest upon its decision to hold Congress to a strict, judicially created evi-
dentiary standard, particularly in respect to lack of justification."
'26 8 He also
wrote:
Unlike courts, Congress can readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess
the magnitude of a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy. Unlike
courts, Congress directly reflects public attitudes and beliefs, enabling Congress
better to understand where, and to what extent, refusals to accommodate a dis-
ability amount to behavior that is callous or unreasonable to the point of lacking
constitutional justification. Unlike judges, Members of Congress can directly
obtain information from constituents who have firsthand experience with dis-
crimination and related issues.
It is beyond dispute that in recent decisions, such as Lopez, Morrison, College
Savings, Florida Prepaid, and Kimel, the Court placed a burden on Congress to
provide evidence for passage of legislation."'
In Garrett, the Court did not discontinue the trend. Yet, the Garrett decision
did serve to narrowly define the kind of specific evidence required by the Court.
The guidance of the Court is clear in Garrett that there must be evidence of
unlawful employment discrimination by a state, not merely general evidence of
discriminatory conduct. Justice Breyer dissented:
The powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment throughout society in gener-
al, including discrimination by private persons and local governments, impli-
cates state governments as well, for state agencies form part of that same larger
society. There is no particular reason to believe that they are immune from the
'stereotypic assumptions' and pattern of 'purposeful unequal treatment.'
However, Justice Kennedy wrote in his concurrence, "It is a question of quite
a different order, however, to say that the States in their official capacities...
must be held in violation of the Constitution on the assumption that they embody
the misconceived or malicious perceptions of some of their citizens."
'272 Justice
Kennedy further stated that simply because a state has failed "to revise policies
now seen as incorrect under a new understanding of proper policy" does not indi-
268. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 382 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 384.
270. For analysis and criticism of the congressional evidence required see William W Buzbee and Robert
A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L. REv. 87 (2001).
271. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 378.
272. Id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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cate that these states have violated the Fourteenth Amendment."' Justice Breyer's
guilt by association assumption may well be true, yet the Court in requiring actu-
al proof as to a pattern of discriminatory actions by the entities to be burdened
actually benefits future legislation."
The benefits to future legislation can be seen through the Court's decisions on
legislation based on other constitutional authority, such as Article I's Commerce
and Patent Clauses. In those cases, the Court required the same quality of evi-
dence as it required for § 5 legislation. Such a requirement of evidentiary proof
serves as a protection to the federal government. Justice Kennedy wrote in Alden,
"We need not attach a label to our dissenting colleagues' insistence that the con-
stitutional structure adopted by the Founders must yield to the politics of the
moment.""27 Indeed, some of the criticism of the original draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment asserted "that giving Congress primary responsibility for enforcing
legal equality would place power in the hands of changing congressional majori-
ties."27 The benefit of setting a high evidentiary bar on Congress is that it pre-
vents future legislation from passing with ease merely because of a change in
political control. While Justices Breyer and Stevens have argued for increased
legislative flexibility, such flexibility does not come without a price. Allowing
Congress broad authority to legislate merely because it is assumed that from gen-
eral evidence there must be some discriminatory act by a State has dangerous
consequences indeed. Justice Kennedy has noted that if States had really been
guilty of discriminatory conduct, then there should be evidence to that end.
Merely because there is a new recognition of a need for more adequate treatment
of disabled individuals does not indicate that States should be found in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.2" Allowing Congress to pass legislation based on
mere general assumptions effectively creates a slippery slope at the bottom of
which lies carte blanche prophylactic legislative authority. If the Supreme Court
will not be allowed to monitor Congress to prevent such an usurpation of author-
ity then who will?27
2. Constitutional Review by Congress or the Court?
Critics of the Supreme Court's recent assertion of judicial review have argued
that individual members of Congress are perfectly able to evaluate the constitu-
273. Id.
274. While certainly requiring actual evidence of unlawful discrimination burdens Congress more than
requiring only one-sided evidence of unlawful discrimination, such a requirement only serves to prevent
unneeded legislation from being enacted. If unlawful discrimination exists, there should be evidence of it. See
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
275. Alden, 527 U.S. at 758-59.
276. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 521.
277. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 375-76 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "If the States had been transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment by their mistreatment or lack of concern for those with impairments, one would have
expected to find in decisions of the courts of the States and also the courts of the United States extensive litiga-
tion and discussion of the constitutional violations. This confirming judicial documentation does not exist. That
there is a new awareness, a new consciousness, a new commitment to better treatment of those disadvantaged
by mental or physical impairments does not establish that an absence of state statutory correctives was a consti-
tutional violation."
278. Such an approach to review by the Court, of course, burdens Congress more than broad deference by
the Court, which is certainly void of any serious standard of review. Yet, again, if there is unlawful discrimina-
tion, there should be evidence of such, and it should not be unreasonable to require Congress to produce such
evidence.
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tionality of legislation. Justice Stevens has argued, "It is the Framers' compro-
mise giving each State equal representation in the Senate that provides the princi-
ple structural protection [of the Constitution] for the sovereignty of the several
States." '279 Such a statement reveals much of the philosophy of many critics: the
Court should keep its powers of constitutional interpretation separate from the
legislative powers of Congress. Yet, such a solution is awash with practical appli-
cation problems. Members of Congress are not as free to evaluate the constitu-
tionality of legislation as one might argue.28 Each is burdened with the needs of
constituents, political parties, and special interest groups. Nor is each member
experienced or qualified to analyze the constitutionality of legislation. Most
importantly, as a practical matter, re-election remains the top priority for most
members of Congress, which guarantees popular laws, regardless of their consti-
tutionality, will get passed or debated.281 Such deficiencies alone argue for a third
party to evaluate constitutionality of legislation, and are too carelessly over-
looked by those advocating congressional deference by the Court.
The problem can be illustrated by a situation where a member is faced with
legislation that may or may not be constitutional; a so-called "borderline" act.
What if a member of Congress is uncertain as to the constitutionality of a certain
piece of legislation? Is a member of Congress expected to go against his or her
constituency's needs, or political party's interests, and vote against an act that
might well be constitutional, because he or she believes it might be unconstitu-
tional? Wouldn't it be beneficial to them to know that another entity will be
responsible for reviewing the constitutionality of legislation?
Of course, the Supreme Court provides a forum of experienced, legal minds,
who can evaluate the constitutionality of legislation without the practical politi-
cal problems of re-election, gaining an important committee seat, or campaign
contributions.2 ' Allowing the Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of
legislation works out best for members of Congress and should be viewed not as
a hindrance to legislation, but as a tool allowing members of Congress to remove
some added pressure in favor of a becoming better politicians.
V CONCLUSION
Just beyond the horizon of Garrett lie future decisions to be rendered on other
pieces of civil rights legislation. Under the current Court's composition, other
civil rights laws that provide a federal forum for private citizens for suits against
state government will be evaluated under a difficult test. Certainly, few would
argue that sovereign immunity is "fair" to the private citizen, and many will con-
tinue to argue for its complete abolition in American jurisprudence. The reality
279. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
280. This is not to say that members of Congress are not bound by an oath to uphold the Constitution.
Members of Congress should be expected to uphold the Constitution. Yet, an argument that they should be the
sole check on the constitutionality of legislation fails to see the reality of the political process, and might well be
a means-end argument for getting around the Courtis right to judicial review.
281. For instance, many may agree that the ADA's definition of disability is vague. However, no member of
Congress would ever dare to try to modify the ADA, as such would be political suicide.
282. See Thomas I. Vanaskie, The Independence and Responsibility of the Federal Judiciary, 46 VILL. L.
REy. 745 (2001).
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of the situation, is, of course, that every state would be reluctant to unequivocally
waive its sovereign immunity and open up its coffers to monetary judgments in
discrimination suits, no matter how "fair" that might be to a private individual.
Therefore, as long as state governments have anything to say about the matter, it
is likely that sovereign immunity will remain firmly entrenched in American law.
The likely stance of states leaves the Supreme Court as perhaps the most pow-
erful potential foe of the states in the war against sovereign immunity, or, at least
sovereign immunity from federal question jurisdiction. The opinion voiced by
the minority of the Court in Garrett and previous cases leaves little doubt as to
the precarious precipice upon which sovereign immunity is situated. Thus, crit-
ics of sovereign immunity will make every attempt to modify either the composi-
tion or the position of the Supreme Court.
As long as sovereign immunity survives, its opponents will continue to seek
out new ways to circumvent its protection of states, whether that is in increasing
the scope of congressional authority by resorting to a broad deference approach,
or by encouraging the use of waiver, or any other as yet undiscovered means.
Such an approach, it seems, may be dangerous because it fails to take into
account any potential future repurcussions that might result from an all-powerful
Congress. In a country that is composed of so many geographic and cultural dif-
ferences, diminishing the ability of the states to protect its citizens through its
general legislative authority by granting more such authority to Congress can
only have disastrous consequences for under-represented state citizens. Such is
the benefit of federalism: that is to keep powers separate among governments to
ultimately protect the people. While few would argue that legislation protecting
disabled individuals is itself destructive, at the bottom of the slippery slope lies a
dangerous chasm. Allowing the legislature to not only enact legislation, but to
define whether or not such legislation is lawful itself, inherently creates an
atmosphere where the potential for the abuse of power is considerable; not to
mention, steps over the bounds of separation of powers.
Thus, judicial review serves as a protection from any one side of government
gaining too much of a foothold on absolute authority, whether such protection is
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, or between the federal
and state governments. Yet, judicial review is overlooked as a potential tool in
providing for a balanced government, and seen instead as an overreaching pro-
tection of "New Federalism" and a hindrance to progressive civil rights legisla-
tion. Opponents of judicial review argue that the Court should be more deferen-
tial to congressional decision-making; however, since deference would ultimately
result in the demise of judicial review, what opponents are actually advocating is
a system of laws that Congress could modify at its every whim. If the Supreme
Court can no longer judicially review legislation, why would Congress need to
follow the law? Of course, only the future will hold the ultimate fate of judicial
review, and whether broad deference to Congress will ultimately destroy the con-
cept. However, for now, judicial review ultimately serves as a protection for the
people of the United States and the Constitution under which we are governed.
Thus, Garrett exemplified a protection of the Court's right of judicial review
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
in accordance with principles that have been ingrained in the American court
system for nearly 200 years. Those who oppose such review fail to see the dan-
ger of allowing Congress to define its own substantive law, and are willing to
support whatever congressional means are required to set its own boundaries
because the legislative ends are noble. Yet, is it wise to completely entrust one
branch of government with such unchecked power and authority? James
Madison wrote words of caution:
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to gov-
ern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be neces-
sary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men,
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.283
Therefore, the Supreme Court in Garrett, through its judicial review of legisla-
tion infringing on sovereign immunity of states under the Eleventh Amendment,
provided a protective control mechanism, not an obstacle to congressional legis-
lation under the Fourteenth Amendment, by assuring that the authority and pow-
ers of members of Congress will continue to be bound by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States.
283. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, Federalist No. 51.
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